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Article 5

The ALI and the UCC
by
LANCE LIEBMAN*

I will speak at less length than some of my colleagues here for
two reasons. One is, my knowledge of this subject is extremely
limited. I've taught for thirty years, but in areas of law that have
nothing to do with these. And, it is only on coming to the American

Law Institute job a year ago, that I find myself learning about
NCCUSL, learning about all these issues, and learning in substantive

ways about commercial law. Suddenly, out of the repressed memory,

have come back my experiences in Professor Brancher's course in
commercial law. I didn't learn it then, and I'm paying the price by
having to learn it now.
But I've already made my contribution to this meeting because
Dean Scott came and presented his outstanding paper in a discussion
session at Columbia Law School.1 We had a very good discussion on
that paper and I thought, this is raising very deep questions, very
important questions, about the UCC process, and about law reform in
a larger way. The American Law Institute itself is not a perfect
institution for discussing and debating that question. The ALI's
meetings normally proceed on the assumption that we're engaged in
working on a Restatement or a statutory project and we work on the
substance. And I thought: "Well, the AALS is the place where
there's a body of law professors-here you are in this room-who live
with these questions everyday and they are very knowledgeable and
very concerned about them." And, by accident, two of my Columbia
colleagues, Carol Sanger and John Manning, were Chairs for, or
involved in the leadership of, the contracts section and the legislation
section. So, here we are. And so, I helped bring about this session,
and having done that I should probably be able to sit down right now.
But I will just make a couple of other attempts to contribute.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 127
(Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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I agree with a great deal of what Gail said-but let me add two
facts that put a little perspective on what she said from my point of
view. One is that there's been a lot of discussion about the cost of
participating, and the ALI has paid for consumer representatives'
expenses to be involved in some of the ALI work and we can do more
of that in the future. Also in our system, for ALI members, we have
members consultative groups for all of our projects, and we've helped
subsidize the attendance and participation of those members at
projects. The ones who are rich lawyers don't need it, but the judges
and the academics sometimes make use of our help in attending and
participating in meetings. I think the participation issue is important
and hardly has been fully solved, but we have made some attempts to
do that.
The second point I'd like make is that I did like the comparison
to the legislature, all of which was based on this very enlightened
nation called California. I was a kid in a capital city, Frankfort,
Kentucky, and I should say to Gail that the legislative process in
Kentucky did not work exactly in all those ways. And now, as an
adult, I have lived in Massachusetts and New York, and I have a
number of friends and former students who are legislators in New
York where they tell me that very often it's thirty days after they vote
for something that they receive the copy or are able to receive in
writing what they enacted. So, California may be a little bit at the, as
you always say, at the left coast of American experience.
Dick Speidel was Dean of my wife's law school in the last
millenium, so he and I go back a ways. Dick said, "The goal of the
ALI is to get it right and the goal of NCCUSL is to get it right enough
to get it enacted." Well, I hope the goal of the American Law
Institute is to get it right. We work to get it right, and I think our
procedures are set up to bring in a lot of input. Of course, Gail's
right, it then takes a very long time. But we get our stuff out there, at
least to our members, who are hardly a cross-section of the legal
profession, much less the country. But our defining idea is of an elite
organization of judges, academics, and practicing lawyers, and to get
these things fully considered by that group. And we're far from
perfect, but we put in the effort to keep drafting and re-drafting and
see if we can get agreement that we more or less stated it properly.
Now, from the beginning, there were questions. The ALI was
founded-it's not as old as NCCUSL-in 1923. From the beginning,
there were questions about how to do that. This is the 1920's I'm
talking about. Langdell, starting in the 1880s, had had a notion that
legal first principles are found in the sky someplace, almost geometric
principles, and then a deductive process would bring us down to their
application to specific events. Forty years later, by the time the ALI
was founded and doing its early work with the first Restatements in
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the 1920s and 30s, legal realism had advanced and that basic
Langdellian idea was not working anymore and it was more of an
inductive process to build law from specific cases and from court
decisions as they had addressed specific cases.
The ALI considered and could have done treatises-it could
have done Codes. There was a stage at the beginning where the ALI
might have turned into some American version of civil law
codification. The ALI certainly could have done statutes. And those
were talked about and discussed, and the records exist, and there was
a notion, "No, we shouldn't do treatises. We'll let the professors go
and continue to do the treatises. We're not going to be a codifying
organization. We're not going to recommend statutes." Rather, and
here's the language from that period, we were going to "bring
together the best minds in the profession and encourage and try to
contribute to a process by which judges would conserve and clarify
the common law and that would be different from Legislatures and
Congress which produce,
this is a quote now, 'undisciplined
2
politicized reform."'
In other words, there was a deep anti-democratic, anti-legislative
idea. John W. Davis said it in an ALI meeting, "None of us here, I
fancy, certainly none of us who are familiar with Congress or the
forty-eight Legislatures of our States, anticipates that this labor shall
be committed to their charge. Law reform cannot be for legislatures,
for elected people. This work, as all of us agree, must be such as to
commend itself to the considered judgment of the craftsmen of the
profession." Who was that? That was the judges, the professors, you
see, the process of judge-made law.
As a little time went by, we got to the World War II period and
suddenly the ALI was selling out that principle, or circumstances
were changing, and it entered into an alliance with a different
organization that stayed-this seems to be the theme of todaystayed in cheaper hotels than we can afford to stay in. And
NCCUSL, a state legislative organization as Fred so well explained,
and the ALI, this elite elected, certainly non-governmental
organization of people who, because they're members, describe
themselves as the 3,000 leading lawyers in America-but you know,
self-identified. These two very different organizations got together
and began the work on the Code which has, until, I would say, recent
years, been widely regarded as a great achievement contributing to
commercial life in the United States.

2. G. Edward White, The ALl and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence,15 LAw
& HsT. REv. 1 (1997).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

They found Llewellyn, and, now I quote from Bob Scott's
colleague, the outstanding historian Ted White. This is Professor
White at the University of Virginia:
As the principal draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code,
[Llewellyn] produced a statute whose organizing jurisprudential
principle was the creation of flexible provisions that could reflect
and accommodate "merchant reality"-the observed practices of
participants in commercial exchange. With its emphasis on
empirical data, flexibility, and the equation of rationality, in the
commercial world, with tacit practice, the UCC was a modernist
and Realist document; it also 3 represented the American Law
Institute's version of law reform.
This was, at that point, a different version of law reform than the
body of Restatements had been. And it was committed to State
Legislatures, this earlier defamed group, but committed to them with
a lot of pressure on them because of this uniformity argument that
Gail now rightly raises questions about. But the uniformity argument
was a way to get fifty, or as Fred says, fifty-three, with the Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, and D.C., fifty-three jurisdictions, to a
substantial extent, to adopt it.
In her recent writings, Lisa Bernstein has raised very deep
questions, and to me, very convincing ones, about the extent to which
Llewellyn and his colleagues did, in fact, know what commercial
reality was, and how much empirical research was done, and those are
fascinating questions.4 But this was the image, or the myth, or the

thought that got us to the recent period. Now we've come to the
present period, and as usual, things continue to change. And in this
period we're in, we've now had the experience that Dick presented.
For me, going back to Dick's quote, "The goal of the ALI is to
get it right." For me, who came into this a little later so I'm not now
speaking at all about events where I was a significant participant-for
me, there was a lot of work done to produce Article 2B-for there to
be a UCC provision about software, licensing of software. When it
came forward the American Law Institute was not persuaded that this
was satisfactory work or work ready to be part of the UCC, and so
the ALI did not approve it. Now, that seems to me consistent with
the idea that the ALI's goal is to get it right. NCCUSL, as fully
within their authority under the agreement between the two
organizations, has taken it out as a model law. Virginia and Maryland
have enacted versions of it, and that's the present situation. Similarly,
Professors Speidel and Rusch did their great work and there was a
draft and many years had been put in, and after debate and vote and
3. Id. at 129-30.
4. See generally Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2"s
IncorporationStrategy: A PreliminaryStudy, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999).
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consideration, the ALI felt that this would be a good new version of
Article 2 and approved. Our sister organization was not persuaded,
and they're within their procedures, and they withdrew it from
consideration. So I run into a variety of people, especially some in
this room, who said at various times, especially when it was a little
hotter last year and whatever, "Isn't this terrible for the ALIT?" or
something like that. And I have to say, I guess I'm too thick-skinned,
but I have to say, I don't feel embarrassed. In other words, 2B did
not persuade the ALI, and we didn't adopt it. 2 did, and we adopted
it. But it takes a lot more than us, happily, to make a law. And the
other group, whose agreement was needed, didn't agree, and so that
didn't become a recommendation, much less a law.
Then the question was whether to take up 2 again, and we did
agree that it was worth another try and the new team went to work on
this and I have to say that the work of Henry Gabriel and Bill
Henning as leaders, and everybody else involved, has been
outstanding. It is by no means clear that we will make it, in other
words, that there will be a Revised Article 2. It is up against thismost of you are experts on this-up against this question of scope.
And scope is simply the question of the boundary between Article 2
and whatever law there is or isn't going to be about software. And
the idea that, the notion that it's a challenge, to figure out the law of
software in the year 2001, seems to me completely understandable.
We're talking about technology that's changing every minute, about
practices that are evolving, questions that are very new. And, I'm not
surprised that that's difficult. Once it is difficult, it's then difficult to
draw the boundary and to see what the connection and the
relationship between Article 2 and Article 2B should be.
We've had very good debates about that at the ALI sessions that
have taken it up: the last two council meetings; the last annual
meeting. And, again, there may not be an Article 2 revision, but I will
not feel that our resources have been misused. In other words, these
have been heavy, serious, quality debates about very serious, up-todate questions, and I think we contribute by being a forum where
these issues are debated. I think Gail and others today will say very
good things about how we can do a better job of being the place
where these issues are debated. I think getting stuff out better and
having various kinds of electronic means so that people don't always
have to have meetings in hotels and can communicate in other Ways,
we can do a lot better at that and we will. But the idea of us as the
forum where people argue, submit, debate, disagree about these
issues is fine.
On the merits, now I want to begin to turn this meeting toward
Dean Scott's paper and ideas. I just want to put five things in front of
you as very serious subjects for academic inquiry, writing, research,
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consideration, and disagreement. There was an assumed ideology
about the UCC when I was a law student; it lasted quite a bit beyond
that time, but it's over now. And so, right now, suddenly-not
suddenly, but in the recent period-every one of these five things has
come to be open for serious argument.
First, do we want our commercial law to be federal or state? My
colleagues at NCCUSL have an ideology and a belief. Their
organization is based-I think, Fred disagreed with a little of this a
few minutes ago-but I think their organization is based on two ideas:
1) uniformity of law and 2) law enacted at the state level. I have
always felt that there is a bit of a tension and maybe even a
contradiction in those two ideas. If we want it uniform, maybe it
should come from Washington. But the federal/state question is in
front of us and in recent years Congress has done important things
about commercial law that begins to, a little bit, destabilize the core
existence of commercial law as a state matter. I think we will, even in
this federalist era, continue to see tension about that question and it
requires careful examination and debate.
Second, what about the argument for uniformity? Would we be
better off if many of these areas of law were taken up State by State?
Maybe that produces a race to the top. Maybe it produces a race to
the bottom. But the question is certainly debatable and has to be
kept in front of us all the time.
Third, the question raised in a very provocative way by Dean
Scott, do we want statute or common law? Going back to what John
W. Davis said, 5 would we have better commercial law, right now,
especially with the very hard questions coming up with new forms of
commerce and new forms of electronic goods or hybrid goods?
Should we, for a period of time, let that law evolve case-by-case,
judge-by-judge? Or, can we make law, statutory law, with sufficient
specificity to be a contribution? Or when we begin doing it, as we
begin seeing the difficulties, do we make the statute so general that
we are continuing, in effect, to leave the matter for court decision?
Fourth, what is the relevance of trade practice? To what extent
do we want simply to have law ratify practice? What is the practice of
those in business?
And fifth, to what extent do we want to acknowledge and
recognize the freedom of the parties to provide? In other words, are
we going to make default rules, or do we, on the other hand, want to
protect, for example, consumers, and perhaps small business?
One of the great ways, fascinating ways, in which that arisesand now I'm talking about Article 1 of the Code for which Professor
Cohen is the Reporter-the issue of choice of law and the ability of
5. See White, supra note 2.
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people to make contracts, or business to make contracts, that say "We
want this handled under the law of New York," or "We want it
handled under the law of Singapore." To what extent do we want to
place limits on the ability of the parties to make their own law?
Each of those is a hard question and many of these issues require
getting into three, four, or five of those five areas, each of them
raising very provocative and difficult matters. Finally, we're at the
point where none of this is solely domestic. The ALI has begun-this
organization formerly known as the American Law Institute-has
now completed its work on insolvency law, Canada, Mexico, and U.S.
I call the project NAFTA Bankruptcy, but it's very serious work
trying to coordinate very different systems. Three languagesFrench, Spanish, English-and already having an effect with some
actions taken in Mexico City recently that is producing a degree of
coordination when bankruptcies occur with assets in more than one of
those three nations. Our work on the Hague convention, judgments
and jurisdiction, is just beginning, but it's very important for
American domestic law, and Professor Hazard's project on
transnational civil procedure, looking to new kinds of civil procedure
for international or transnational commercial disputes. So there's
going to be more of all of this work occurring in an international
setting.
I guess I would only leave you with two small points that occur to
me after my showing you very recent, and so far not, so deep,
involvement in these matters. One is, I don't believe we're going to
go back to a point where none of it is statutory. In other words, I
think in a democratic society, the Legislatures are going to be
involved, that Congress is going to be involved. That then gets you to
all kinds of good public choice questions about what roles should be
played by organizations such as NCCUSL and the ALI. What sort of
role in recommending or urging legislation? It's a parallel question to
the historic role of the ALI through its Restatements in trying to
persuade judges of what the best common law is. But it's different in
various ways, and I think Gail has raised a lot of those differences in a
very helpful way. But I think, and perhaps Bob Scott and I disagree
about this, I think statutes are here for at least another period of time.
The second and final point I'll make is, I do think that when
we're talking about information, or intellectual property, or these
new sorts of barely-coming-into-existence electronic and other
methods, I think we do have new and difficult questions. I think they
are different, and thus, I think -we shouldn't be surprised that we have
to struggle very hard to work our way towards legal concepts, and
then that drawing the boundaries is difficult, bordering on impossible.
And so when you hear references from this microphone in the last
hour to people of good faith who have had lots of problems recently, I
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think one of the reasons is that the boundary between the refrigerator
and the refrigerator that's really a computer is a hard, not an easy, set
of questions. I'm not surprised that it's proving difficult and will take
some time to figure them out.
Thank you.

